The New York Law Governing the Relative Rights of Assignees and Third Party Claimants to a Future Fund by unknown
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 27 Issue 4 Article 5 
1958 
The New York Law Governing the Relative Rights of Assignees 
and Third Party Claimants to a Future Fund 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
The New York Law Governing the Relative Rights of Assignees and Third Party Claimants to a Future 
Fund, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 579 (1958). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol27/iss4/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
COMMENTS
THE NEW YORK LAW GOVERNING THE RELATIVE RIGHTS OF
ASSIGNEES AND THIRD PARTY CLAIMANTS TO
A FUTURE FUND
The New York Court of Appeals of 1882, in the case of Williams v. Ingersoll,'
decided that an assignee of a fund to accrue in futuro had a right in the fund
when it came in esse and that his right was superior to the right of a lien cred-
itor. This was so even though the latter had perfected his attachment before
the fund came into existence. The New York Court of Appeals of 1957, in the
case of City of New York v. Bedford Bar & Grill, Inc.,2 decided that the same
kind of assignee of the same type of fund had a claim thereto, but that his claim
was inferior to that of a lien creditor. Here the lien creditor had not perfected
his attachment until after the fund came into existence. The cases are abso-
lutely irreconcilable.
Of course, the fact that a particular holding is contra to prior law is not con-
demnation per se. It may be that "some judge has taken the bold step of
creating new law to meet new circumstances or remove an anomaly, instead of
weakly clinging to the security of pure logic."3 Unfortunately, the "bold steps"
taken in the law of assignments of future funds, far from removing anomalies,
more often have perpetuated them. Such was the result of the Bedford Bar &
Grill case.
Despite the anomalous state of the law, it is possible to penetrate what has
been called, "the atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty which permeates the
whole field of security [or absolute] assignment of future funds," 4 and to trace
almost every aberration to the failure of a court to maintain the natural dis-
tinction between equitable assignments of future funds and equitable mortgages
of after-acquired chattels.5 As one writer has observed, .the ambiguity of the
Bedford Bar & Grill opinion "arises from the court's use of what appear to be
inconsistent lines of authority."6
The object of this comment is to strip away the "inconsistent lines of au-
1. 89 N.Y. 508 (1882).
2. 2 N.Y.2d 429, 141 N.E.2d 575, 161 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1957).
3. Logic of the Illogical, 140 N.Y.LJ., Aug. 29, 1958, p. 4, col. 1.
4. Seligson, The "Secret" Federal Tax Lien, 139 N.Y.LJ., May 19, 1958, p. 4, col. 1.
5. The courts are not always blind to the distinction. In Okn v. Isaac Goldman Co.,
79 F.2d 317, 320 (2d Cir. 1935), the court observed, "in . . . [a prior case], we held that
a mortgage on after-acquired chattels, while creating an equitable lien on property when
it comes into existence as against simple creditors or purchasers with notice, under the
New York law would not prevail against the legal lien of an attaching or execution cred-
itor or a trustee in bankruptcy. This decision only affected tangible property capable of
reduction to manual possession and not choses in action." The court in In re Barnett, 124
F.2d 1005, 1008 (2d Cir. 1942), also noted the distinction, but decided that it was not its
function "to explain why the New York courts distinguish between the validity of mort-
gages and pledges of after-acquired property, and assignments of expectancies."
6. 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 608, 611 n.22 (1958); see also 26 Fordham L. Rev. 552, 554-55
(1957).
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thority" and, in the light of prior decisions, to determine what rules should
govern the rights among assignees and third party claimants to a future fund
in New York. Before any such determination can be made, and even before
any meaningful definition of "future fund" can be formulated, some considera-
tion must be given to the history of the assignability of choses in action.
THE ASSIGNABILITY OF CHOSES iN ACTION AT COMMON LAW
Choses in action, expectancies, possibilities and the like were not assignable
at common law, with the result that the assignee thereof acquired no rights
which a court of law would recognize. 7 The origin of the common-law aversion
to such assignments is uncertain. It is sometimes attributed to the reluctance
of the law courts to enforce a transaction "which savored of champerty and
maintenance."18 However, the true explanation is probably found in the then
prevailing principle that the relation between the original obligor and the
original obligee was itself a vital part of the contract.9 It is possible to trace,
in turn, this view of the strictly personal relationship between the contracting
parties to the old common-law identification of rights and possession:
If A, being the possessor of a horse or a field, gives up the possession to B, the
rights which B acquires stand on the same ground as A's did before....
But there is no possession possible of a contract. The fact that a consideration
was given yesterday by A to B, and a promise received in return, cannot be laid hold
of by X and transferred from A to himself. The only thing which can be transferred
is the benefit or burden of the promise, and how can they be separated from the
facts which gave rise to them? How, in short, can a man sue or be sued on a
promise in which he had no part?10
While the law courts uniformly refused to enforce an assignment of a chose
in action (including, of course, a fund which is essentially a debt), the courts
of equity, as early as the fifteenth century, recognized the validity of such
transfers," the ratio being that "a man may bind himself to do anything not
impossible, and that he ought to perform his obligations when not illegal .... ,12
As time passed, the law courts began to take cognizance of the equitable
rights of an assignee of a chose in action.'3 As a result, by the end of the
eighteenth century, a legal fiction had evolved to the effect that the assignment
created an irrevocable power of attorney in the assignee to collect and retain
the proceeds of the chose in action assigned. 14 This fiction operated to give effect
at law to the assignee's right. Subsequent evolution in the common law has
7. 4 Pomeroy, Equity § 1270 (5th ed. 1941).
8. 4 Am. Jur. Assignments § 3 (1936).
9. 2 Williston, Contracts § 405 (rev. ed. 1936).
10. Holmes, The Common Law 340-41 (1881). Not only were choses in action not
transferable at common law, but also they were not lienable. Even today the right to
attach such property depends upon special act of the legislature. 4 Am. Jur. Attachment
& Garnishment § 187 (1936).
11. Walsh, Equity § 4 (1930).
12. 4 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 1270.
13. See 4 Corbin, Contracts § 856 (1951).
14. Simpson, Contracts § 87 (1954).
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made recognition of the assignability of choses in action "the rule, and non
assignability the exception."' 5
But exceptions do remain. "The common law denies the validity of ... [an
assignment of] a claim or chose in action to arise in the future,"'16 the reason
being that since the fund has no present existence, there is nothing to assign.17
In equity, however,
such assignments always operate by way of agreements or contracts amounting in
the consideration of the court to this, that one agrees with another to transfer and
make good that right or interest, and, like any other agreement, the court will cause
it to be specifically performed (not leaving the assignor to his action for damages)
when the assignor is in a condition to transfer the thing assigned or causes it to be
transferred.' 8
WHEN Is A FUND A FUTURE FUND?
In Field v. Mayor of New York 9 the assignor had assigned moneys which
he anticipated earning under contracts which he reasonably expected to enter
into with the City of New York. The money was subsequently earned and the
city, with notice of the assignment, nevertheless paid the assignor, claiming
that the assignment had passed no interest, not even an equitable one, for the
reason that no contract existed at the time of the assignment. The court of
appeals, in finding that the transaction had resulted in an equitable assignment
of a future fund, proceeded to define "future fund" in the context of legal and
equitable assignments:
The nature of the claim is one peculiarly of equitable cognizance. . . . If the
claims of Bell [assignor] against the city had accrued and been in being at the time
of the assignment, and the assignment had been of any specific entire claim, and
perhaps if it had been of all claims then due from the city to Bell, the remedy of
Garread, his assignee, might, and perhaps in general, must, have been at law. But all
the cases where the contract [of assignment] has been in relation to things not in
existence at the time, and which were in expectancy and possibility merely, show
that their adjudication belongs exclusively to a court of equity. 0
The case fairly definitely established the line of demarcation between the
assignment of a fund "in expectancy" and of a fund "in being" and the rights
incident to each. The assignment of a fund "in being" is immediately effective
at law, and the assignment of a fund "in expectancy" is enforceable in equity
to give effect to the assignee's interest when the debts intended to be assigned
are subsequently brought into existence. Clearly, then, New York is not in
accord with the Restatement rule which requires that the contract, under which
the fund is to be earned, be in existence when the assignment is made in order
that there may be an effective assignment even in equity.2 ' On the contrary, it
15. 4 Am. Jur. Assignments § 3 (1936).
16. Anson, Contracts § 338 (Patterson ed. 1939).
17. Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508, 518 (1882); Field v. Mayor of New York, 6
N.Y. 179, 186 (1852).
18. Williams v. Ingersoll, supra note 17, at 519.
19. 6 N.Y. 179 (1852).
20. Id. at 187; accord, Pierce v. Devlin, 67 Hun 652, 22 N.Y. Supp. 208 (Sup. Ct. 1893).
21. Restatement, Contracts § 154 (1932) reads as follows: "(1) Except as stated in
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would seem sufficient in New York, "that there be a reasonable expectancy that
the debt will be earned and the fund come into existence.12 2 Accordingly, effect
has been given in equity to the assignment of expectancies in estates,23 of future
accounts receivable,24 of anticipated recoveries in law suits, 25 of future wages, 26
of future rent,27 and of the proceeds of the anticipated sale of personal
property.28
§ 151, a right expected to arise in the future, under a contract or employment in existence
at the time of the assignment, can be effectively assigned.
"(2) An assignment of a right expected to arise under a contract or employment not
then existing is operative only as a promise by the assignor to assign the right and an
authorization to the assignee to enforce it, but neither imposes a duty upon the obligor
nor precludes garnishment by the obligee's creditors."
Comment b under § 154 indicates that where the assignment is of a right to arise under
a future contract, the assignor has the power to revoke the assignment. Whether the
assignee will have any liability to the assignor (apparently for damages only) will depend
upon whether the promise to assign was contractually binding. The Field case, on the
other hand, holds that as soon as the assigned claim accrues, it is invested with the equitable
interest of the assignee, i.e., "immediately on the assignment the equitable interest in the
debt as between the parties to it immediately passed to the assignee. And if the assignor
had afterward recovered the debt, he would be obliged to pay it over to the assignee."
Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508, 522-23 (1882). Whether this interest can be defeated
by a subsequent transfer to a bona fide purchaser for value is treated at pp. 580-86 infra.
Whether it can be defeated by a subsequent attachment by a lien creditor is treated at
pp. 586-94 infra.
In accord with § 154 is 4 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 7, at § 1283, § 1289 n.20 (5th ed.
1941).
22. Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, 229 N.Y. 179, 182, 128 N.E. 113, 114 (1920). Hence,
"if the subject-matter of an assignment has no actual existence, it should have at least
potential existence." Thompson v. Gimbel Bros., 71 Misc. 126, 130, 128 N.Y. Supp. 210,
213 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1911). For cases in other jurisdictions, see Annot., 116 A.L.R. 955
(1938).
23. In re Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1942); Stover v. Eycleshimer, 42 N.Y. 620
(1867); see Annot., 17 A.L.R. 597 (1922); 44 A.L.R. 1465 (1926); cf. Annot., 175 A.L.R.
1132 (1948).
24. Greey v. Dockendorff, 231 U.S. 513 (1913); In re Hawley Down-Draft Furnace
Co., 238 Fed. 122 (3d Cir. 1916); Authorized Credit Corp. v. Enterprise Industrial Co.,
109 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. City Ct. 1951).
25. Fairbanks v. Sargent, 117 N.Y. 320, 22 N.E. 1039 (1889); Williams v. Ingersoll,
89 N.Y. 508 (1882); cf. Annot., 124 A.L.R. 1508 (1940); 143 A.L.R. 204 (1943); 40
A.L.R.2d 500 (1955).
26. The New York law gives effect to the assignment as between the parties thereto,
but the rights of the assignee may be subject to those of subsequent third party claimants.
See p..593 infra.
27. Harris v. Taylor, 35 App. Div. 462, 54 N.Y. Supp. 864 (1st Dep't 1898); Conley
v. Fine, 181 App. Div. 675, 169 N.Y. Supp. 162 (1st Dep't 1918) (dictum); see Abelow,
An Historical Analysis of Assignments of Rent in New York, 6 Brooklyn L. Rev. 25,
37-40 (1936).
28. Matter of Gruner, 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1946). However, there must be
some enforceable obligation of the assignor to sell the personal property so that the
Situated somewhere between the assignment of a fund "in being" and of a
fund "in expectancy" is the assignment of a fund to be earned in the future
under a presently existing contract. In an early case, such unearned moneys
were denominated a "fund to accrue in futuro."29 Clearly, this is not a fund
"accrued," and "in being," and "then due." In other words, it does not possess
the characteristics, set out in the Field case, of a debt which is capable of legal
assignment. Consequently, it has been held in later cases that an assignment
of funds to be earned in the future under a contract which presently binds the
assignor is an equitable assignment.30 Furthermore, since the assigned fund is
essentially in Juturo, the assignment cannot be immediately effective to pass a
present legal right. "It [the assignment], as between the parties to it, operated
as an equitable assignment and, in equity, created an ownership in the plaintiff
of so much of the designated fund when created, as was specified and assigned
in it."13  New York, therefore, is not in accord with the rule sometimes stated
that where there is a contract in existence under which the fund is to b6 earned,
the assignment is properly a legal assignment. 32 Such a rule presumes that the
assigned fund is not in fact a future fund but rather has some present exist-
assigned proceeds will have at least potential existence. Vernon v. Kelton, 48 N.Y.S.2d
659 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
29. Brill v. Tuttle, 81 N.Y. 454, 457 (1880).
30. Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, 220 N.Y. 179, 128 N.E. 113 (1920); Bates v. Salt Springs
Nat'l Bank, 157 N.Y. 322, 51 N.E. 1033 (1898); Crouch v. Muller, 141 N.Y. 495, 36 N.E.
394 (1894); cf. Lynch v. Conger, 181 App. Div. 221, 168 N.Y. Supp. 855 (3d Dep't),
aff'd mem., 229 N.Y. 543, 129 N.E. 908 (1920), wherein the assignment of funds to be
earned under a construction contract, not yet entered into, but already awarded to the
assignor, was described as an equitable assignment.
31. Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, supra note 30, at 183, 128 N.E. at 114 (emphasis added).
In support of this proposition, the court cited, indisdriminately, cases involving assign-
ments of funds under presently existing contracts, assignment of funds under contracts to
be entered into in the future and assignments of expectancies. In Matter of Gruner, 295
N.Y. 510, 517, 68 N.E.2d 514, 518 (1946), the court cited (without differentiation) a case
involving the assignment of a future right under an existing contract, and a case involving
the assignment of a future right under a future contract in support of the proposition that,
"each member of the [stock] exchange has a right to the proceeds of the sale of his seat
and that right may be assigned." In Hussey v. Flanagan, 237 N.Y. 227, 233, 142 N.E. 594,
595-96 (1923), similar indiscriminate citation was employed to support the proposition
that, "defendant's agreement to receive and pay over to plaintiff certain securities which
might be received by him on the sale of plaintiff's rights might be regarded as an equitable
assignment, and that when the securities were actually received this assignment attached
thereto and gave to plaintiff such a right and interest in the securities that he could main-
tain an action for conversion against defendant when the latter withheld the same." Thus
the New York cases do not differentiate, in considering the effectiveness, at least as between
the parties, of an equitable assignment of a future right, between a future right under an
existing contract and a future right under a future contract. The effectiveness of such
assignments as against third parties is the subject of the remainder of this comment.
32. The source of the rule is the case of Rockmore v. Lehman, 129 F.2d 892 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1942). See Simpson, Contracts § 91 (1954). This case,
though correct in its result, completely misstated the New York law when it held such an
assignment to be legal rather than equitable.
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ence. 33 Rather, the New York law is that whether the assignment is of funds
to be earned in the future under an existing contract, or of funds to be earned
under a contract to be entered into in the future, it is an equitable assignment.
Under either view, the assignment is effective to transfer the assignor's rights
in the assigned fund so that the fund, when it comes in esse is invested with
the interest of the assignee. An assignment of funds already earned is a legal
assignment which immediately effects a transfer of interest in the assigned fund.
PRIORITY AMONG AsSIGNEES
In New York, the general rules of priority among successive assignees of the
same chose in action from the same assignor were established in two early cases.
Muir v. Schenck 34 concerned successive assignments by the obligee of a chose
in action in esse at a time when such assignments were given effect only in
equity. The court, in a landmark decision, found irrelevant the fact that the
second assignee was a bona fide purchaser, and held that after the first assign-
ment, the assignor had nothing left to transfer. His equitable interest was
gone, and his legal title was not assignable. Hence the first assignee prevailed.
This principle of qui prior est tempore, potior est jure thereafter formed the
basis of the holding in Bush v. Lathrop,35 that the equities existing between the
assignor and assignee of a chose in action, not negotiable, attach to the title
transferred to a subsequent assignee for value without notice.
On the basis of these early cases, it is clear that the first-in-time, first-in-right
rule will determine the rights between successive assignees at least where they
are of the same class, i.e., both legal, or both equitable. Thus, it is generally
held in New York that the assignee prior in point of time will be protected
although he has given no notice of the assignment to either the subsequent
assignee or the debtor,30 and if the subsequent assignee has collected the
assigned funds, he is deemed to hold them as a constructive trustee for the
benefit of the first assignee. 37
The English rule is different, and, "he will have preference who first gives
notice to the debtor, even if he be a subsequent assignee, providing at the time
of taking it he had no notice of the prior assignment." 38 The conflict between
33. Simpson, Contracts § 91 (1954). In treating a right to arise in the future under a
presently existing contract as an "existing right," Professor Simpson is in conflict with
the Restatement which classifies such a right as a "future right." See Restatement, Con-
tracts § 154, comment a (1932).
34. 3 Hill 228 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); Suchy v. Frankenberg, 251 App. Div. 349, 296
N.Y. Supp. 545 (1st Dep't 1937).
35. 22 N.Y. 535 (1860); accord, Ingraham v. Disborough, 47 N.Y. 421 (1872).
36. Rochester Ropes v. Scherl, 121 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1941); Niles v. Mathusa, 162
N.Y. 546, 57 N.E. 184 (1900); Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N.Y. 277, 41 N.E. 572 (1895).
It should be noted, however, that a debtor who pays the assignor without notice of the
assignment has no liability to the assignee. Heermans v. Ellsworth, 64 N.Y. 159 (1876);
Sillman v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 3 N.Y.2d 395, 402, 144 N.E.2d 387, 391,
165 N.Y.S.2d 498, 503 (1957) (dictum).
37. Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 214 App. Div. 525, 212 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1st
Dep't 1925) ; 25 Cornell L.Q. 283, 284-85 (1939).
38. Hanna v. Lichtenhein, 182 App. Div. 94, 97, 169 N.Y. Supp. 589, 591 (1st Dep't
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the English and New York rules results from a difference in theory as to the
very nature of an assignment of a chose in action. The English rule emphasizes
the common-law identification of rights and possession:
[Y]ou must do everything towards having possession which the subject admits;
you must do that which is tantamount to obtaining possession, by placing every
person, who has an equitable or legal interest in the matter, under an obligation to
treat it as your property. For this purpose, you must give notice to the legal holder
of the fund; in the case of a debt, for instance, notice to the debtor is, for many
purposes, tantamount to possession. If you omit to give that notice, you are guilty
of the same degree and species of neglect as he who leaves a personal chattel, to
which he has acquired a title, in the actual possession, and under the absolute con-
trol, of another person.39
The heart of the English rule, then, is that the chose in action like the chattel
must be possessed. On the other hand, the underlying principle of the New
York rule is that, in traiisfers of choses in action, "there is nothing which cor-
responds to the delivery of possession of chattels.1 40  Hence, notice to the
debtor, which is "tantamount to possession," is not necessary. Of course, "it
is impossible to eliminate all risk from such a transaction. If the second assignee
elects to rely on the representations of the vendor as to his title, and is deceived,
he cannot shift his loss to the first assignee, unless some act or omission of the
latter was proximate to the deception."141
1918) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 225 N.Y. 579, 122 N.E. 625 (1919). The English
xule is the majority rule. See Annot., 31 A.L.R. 876 (1924), 110 A.L.R. 774 (1937). Re-
statement, Contracts § 173(b) (1932), advocates a rule which is different from both the
New York and the English rules: "Any assignee who purchases his assignment for value
in good faith without notice of a prior assignment, and who obtains (i) payment or satis-
faction of the obligor's duty, or (ii) judgment against the obligor, or (ii) a new contract
with the obligor by means of a novation, or (iv) delivery of a tangible token or writing,
surrender of which is required by the obligor's contract for its enforcement, can retain any
performance so received and can enforce any judgment or novation so acquired, and, if he
has obtained a token or writing as stated in sub-clause (iv), can enforce against the obligor
the assigned right." For a contrast between the New York and the Restatement rules, see
Restatement, Contracts, N.Y. Annot. § 173 (1933).
39. Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. Ch. 1, 23, 38 Eng. Rep. 475, 483-84 (Ch. 1823) (emphasis
added); accord, Hanna v. Lichtenhein, supra note 38, at 97, 169 N.Y. Supp. at 591. The
court in Dearle v. Hall, supra at 20, 38 Eng. Rep. at 482-83, specifically rejected the pre-
vailing New York principle of qui prior est in tempore, potior est in jure.
40. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 362 (1925) (emphasis added) (dictum). "In-
tangible choses in action do not lie 'in livery."' 2 Williston, Contracts § 430 (rev. ed. 1936).
41. Salem Co. v. Manufacturers' Co., 264 U.S. 182, 197-98 (1924); cf. Fairbanks v.
Sargent, 104 N.Y. 108, 124, 9 N.E. 870, 879 (1887). What "act or omission" on the part
of the first assignee will be sufficient to defeat his priority? In Moore v. Metropolitan
Nat'l Bank, 55 N.Y. 41 (1873) it was held that a bona fide purchaser for value of a non-
negotiable chose in action from one upon whom the owner has, by assignment, conferred
the apparent absolute ownership, where the purchase is made upon the faith of such ap-
parent ownership, obtains a valid title as against the real owner who is estopped from
asserting a title in hostility thereto. Accord, Second Russian Ins. Co. v. Franco-American
Chem. Co., 125 Misc. 346, 209 N.Y. Supp. 753 (Sup. Ct. 1925); cf. McNeil v. Tenth Nat'l
Bank, 46 N.Y. 325 (1871). So much of Bush v. Lathrop, as would have made the second
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This "caveat assignee" principle obviously is essentially inconsistent with
the solicitous attitude toward assignees expressed by the English rule. It must,
therefore, also be inconsistent with the principles governing the rights between
transferees of chattels, since these principles form the ratio of the English rule
as to assignees. This inconsistency becomes unmistakably apparent when the
law surrounding New York's chattel mortgage recording act 42 is considered.
EQUITABLE MORTGAGES vs. EQUITABLE ASSIGNMENTS
The recording act requires that every mortgage of goods and chattels which
is not accompanied by an immediate transfer of possession of the thing mort-
gaged must be recorded. If not recorded, it will be void as against creditors of
the mortgagor and as against subsequent purchasers and mortgagees in good
faith for a fair consideration. In effect, the act substitutes recording for pos-
session of the thing mortgaged.
In Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey4 3 a mortgage was given on crops not
yet planted. Thereafter, while the crops were growing, the mortgagor's judg-
ment creditor caused the sheriff to levy upon them. As a result, a dispute arose
as to priority between the mortgagee and the creditor. The court reasoned that
the recording provisions of the chattel mortgage recording act were merely a
substitute for transfer of possession. Since there could not be a transfer of
possession of non-existent chattels, the court concluded that neither could
there be a legal mortgage of them. Nevertheless, the court did concede that a
mortgage of after-acquired chattels might be enforced in equity as between the
parties when the chattels came into existence. However, the equitable right of
the mortgagee against the debtor could not prevail over the creditor's attach-
ment and the sheriff's possession because the filing of the mortgage was a nullity
and therefore under the statute the attaching creditor prevailed. There is prob-
ably good reason to question the wisdom of this rule of law which imposes the
sanctions which result from a failure to record, and which at the same time pre-
cludes recording. 44 However, it is not the purpose of this comment to explore
assignee's title subject to the infirmities of that of his assignor (who was himself the
assignee of only apparent ownership) was overruled. However, the peculiar facts of the
Moore case seem to form the only basis, in the absence of collusion between the assignor
and the first assignee, for an exception to the Bush v. Lathrop rule. See Fairbanks v. Sargent,
104 N.Y. 108, 117, 9 N.E. 870, 876 (1887), "We understand that the rule stated in Bush v.
Lathrop, with the exception mentioned, stands in full force ...
42. N.Y. Lien Law § 230.
43. 142 N.Y. 570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894); see Titusville Iron Co. v. City of New York,
207 N.Y. 203, 100 N.E. 806 (1912); Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E.
127 (1907); New York Sec. & Trust Co. v. Saratoga Gas & Light Co., 159 N.Y. 137, 51
N.E. 1092 (1899).
44. In Kribbs v. Alford, 120 N.Y. 519, 24 N.E. 811 (1890), the court had held that
recording of a mortgage on after-acquired chattels was effective as against subsequent in-
nocent purchasers for value. The Rochester Distilling case left New York in the anomalous
position of enforcing the recorded mortgage as against innocent purchasers, but not as
against lien creditors. See Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" In New York, 20 Colum. L.
Rev. 519, 527-28 (1920). Neither case has been overruled, although Rochester Distilling
Co. v. Rasey is more often cited, and seems more firmly entrenched.
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this problem. It is sufficient here to note the inapplicability of the Rochester
Distilling Co. rule to the assignment of future funds.
Choses in action, unlike chattels are not amenable to possession even when
they are in esse. Therefore, it is generally held that security assignments of
existing choses in action cannot be within the purview of the chattel mortgage
recording act.45 Particularly in New York, where there is nothing in the assign-
ment of choses in actioA which corresponds to a transfer of possession of chat-
tels, the respective rights of the assignee, of the assignor's attaching creditor,
and of subsequent purchasers for value, are determined without regard to
possession or recording.46 If a chose in action in esse cannot be possessed,
neither can a chose in action in futuro. It follows, therefore, that the rights
of claimants to a future fund must also be determined without regard to pos-
session or recording. It follows, further, that in deciding the priority of these
rights, resort may not be had to those cases involving equitable mortgages of
after-acquired chattels in which the non-possessability of the future chattels
is held to be a determining factor.
An awareness of these differences in theory which underlie the decisions
involving mortgages of future chattels and assignments of future funds, together
with a consciousness of New York's "caveat assignee" attitude is indispensable
to the separation of the "inconsistent lines of authority" from the law which
should determine the rights of the assignee and of third party claimants to
a future fund.
PioIy BETWEEN EQUITABLE AND LEGAL ASSIGNEES OF THE SAM1E FUND
It is settled law in New York that an equitable assignee of a fund to accrue
in futuro will be preferred to a subsequent legal assignee, who takes his assign-
ment after the fund comes into existence, where the latter is not a bona fide
purchaser for value.47 Moreover, there is broad language in some cases
45
and dicta in others49 to the effect that the prior equitable assignee will be pre-
45. See cases collected at 2 Williston, Contracts § 430 n.23 (rev. ed. 1936); accord,
Annot., 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 666, 667 (1910); 4 Am. jur. Assignments § 88 (1936).
46. In re Michigan Furniture Co., 249 Fed. 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); Niles v. Mathusa, 162
N.Y. 546, 57 N.E. 184 (1900); 26 Fordham L. Rev. 552, 555 (1957). In Stackhouse v.
Holden, 66 App. Div. 423, 427, 73 N.Y. Supp. 203, 205 (4th Dep't 1901), the court said:
"The rules pertaining to a change in possession of goods and chattels upon a sale thereof,
or to the filing of a lien thereon, and the dominion required to be exercised by a purchaser,
mortgagee, or pledgee of tangible property, cannot be applied to a sale or pledge of in-
debtedness intangible of itself ... as to one, the possession of which is evidence of owner-
ship, the dealings must be open, visible and public; while as to the other the business may
be, as it usually is, private."
47. See, e.g., Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, 229 N.Y. 179, 128 N.E. 113 (1920); Hovey v.
Elliott, 118 N.Y. 124, 23 N.E. 475 (1890); La Fetra v. Hudson Trust Co., 203 App. Div.
729, 197 N.Y. Supp. 332 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 236 N.Y. 533, 142 N.E. 272 (1923);
Authorized Credit Corp. v. Enterprise Industrial Co., 109 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y. City Ct.
1951).
48. Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 214 App. Div. 525, 212 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1st
Dep't 1925) ; Matter of Kitching's Will, 141 Misc. 704, 253 N.Y. Supp. 112 (Surr. Ct. 1931).
49. Hovey v. Elliott, 118 N.Y. 124, 147, 23 N.E. 475, 481 (1890) (dissenting opinion)
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ferred even if the subsequent legal assignee is a bona fide purchaser for value.
Such a dictum appeared in Fairbanks v. Sargent,5 ° where the court raised the
question of whether an assignee of a chose in action could ever actually be con-
sidered an "innocent purchaser."
In the Fairbanks case, a client had assigned to his attorney one third of
whatever recovery the attorney might obtain in the prosecution of the client's
contract claim against a third party. Thereafter, the client assigned the
matured contract claim itself to a creditor in satisfaction of a prior indebted-
ness. The court preferred the prior assignment to the attorney of the future
fund to the subsequent assignment to the creditor of the existing chose in action
(which the court, in error, called an equitable assignment).51 In so doing, it
dealt with the subsequent assignee's claim to be an innocent purchaser by
noting that he "must be presumed to have known the law, and that, in col-
lecting a non-negotiable chose in action, which he had acquired by assignment
from another, he was subject to the liability of being required to satisfy the
claim of prior assignees thereof.15 2 Since the subsequent assignee is thus pre-
sumed to have notice of prior assignments, "he could not acquire an inde-
feasible right to such a claim by any form of assignment; and in discharging
the debtor from his liability thereon, he did so subject to his liability to un-
known claimants with equities superior to his own." 53
The Fairbanks case came back to the court of appeals a second time,54 on
the issue of whether, since the assignor had delivered the fund when it came
in esse to the second assignee, the latter had obtained legal title so that he could
claim preference to the first assignee on the principle that as between equitable
assignees, he will have priority who first obtains legal title.55 The court assumed
arguendo the validity of the principle but found that the first assignee would
still prevail since his equity had ripened into legal title as soon as the fund
came into the hands of the assignor, before it had been delivered to the
second assignee.
(dictum); McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 266 App. Div. 599, 42 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1st Dep't)
(dictum), aff'd, 292 N.Y. 347, 55 N.E.2d 192, cert. granted, 323 U.S. 687, aff'd, 323 U.S.
365 (1944); but see R. C. Williams & Co. v. Ace Restaurant Inc., 101 N.Y.L.J. 2984 (1934)
(dictum): "A later legal interest [in a chose in action] has priority over an equitable in-
terest only where the former is urged by a bona fide purchaser for value without notice."
A similar dictum appears in Muir v. Schenck, 3 Hill 228, 232 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842), but
probably it was not meant to refer to interests in choses in action since at the time all
assignments of choses in action created equitable interests only.
50. 104 N.Y. 108, 9 N.E. 870 (1887).
51. The assignment of the matured contract claim was a legal assignment within the
categories set out in Field v. Mayor of New York, 6 N.Y. 179 (1852). See note 21 supra.
It is true that the assignment was for security purposes, but the courts do not seem to
distinguish between absolute and security assignments. See In re New York, N.H. & H. R.
Co., 25 F. Supp. 874 (D. Conn. 1938) (applying New York law); 12 Fordham L.
Rev. 63, 66 (1943).
52. 104 N.Y. at 124, 9 N.E. at 879.
53. Ibid. (emphasis added).
54. Fairbanks v. Sargent, 117 N.Y. 320, 22 N.E. 1039 (1889).
55. See 6 C.J.S. Assignments § 91 (b) (1937).
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This exact result was reached in a subsequent court of appeals case, but
here the court expressed doubt as to whether the rule of priorities, which had
been assumed, but neither rejected nor adopted, in the second Fairbanks
case, should be considered the law of this state. 8
At first blush, it might appear that the court in the second Fairbanks case
was following the equitable mortgage equation of rights and possession when
it held that legal title vested in the first assignee as soon as his agent (the
assignor) obtained possession of the fund. Such is not the case. The court
did not hold that the vesting of legal title created any different rights in the
first assignee than he had before. Rather, it would seem from a consideration
of the nature of assignments of choses in action that the designation of an
assignee as "legal" (either because he took the assignment when the fund
was already in esse, or because he took possession of the fund when it came
in esse) is a procedural device, and signifies no substantive rights.
It is not disputed that the assignment of choses in action formerly gave
rise only to equitable rights. While certain of these assignments today are
enforceable at law, they remain nevertheless equitable in nature. 57 The forum
of enforcement should not determine the quality of the right. The priority
among assignees, the rights of all of whom are essentially equitable, should,
therefore, be decided without regard to any distinction between legal and
equitable titles.58 When this distinction is disregarded, and when those
equitable assignment cases which rely on equitable mortgage decisions59 are
discarded, the standard of preference in New York is priority in time.
Considering the prevalent "caveat assignee" attitude in New York, the
inapplicability of cases involving equitable mortgages of after-acquired chat-
tels, and the fundamentally equitable nature of every assignment of a chose
in action, it is submitted that the assignee of a fund to accrue in futuro acquires
a right in the fund prior to the right of a subsequent "legal" assignee of the
56. Central Trust Co. v. West India Imp. Co., 169 N.Y. 314, 324, 62 N.E. 387, 390 (1901).
57. 2 Williston, Contracts §§ 446A, 438 (rev. ed. 1936).
58. Middle West Roads Co. v. People's Natl Bank & Trust Co., 210 Ind. 437, 4 N.E.2d
187 (1936) ; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bagg, 292 Mass. 125, 197 N.E. 481 (1935). This
is the "modern view." First Natl Bank v. Pomona Tile Mfg. Co., 82 Cal. App. 2d 592, 186
P.2d 693 (1948).
59. In Glass v. Springfield, L. I. Cemetery Soc., 252 App. Div. 319, 299 N.Y. Supp. 244
(1st Dep't 1937) it was held that when, without notice of infirmity, a party becomes a
purchaser for value of a chose in action, his legal title is superior to the equitable rights
previously created in favor of third parties. However, the only New York case relied on
in the opinion to support this proposition is Rochester Distilling Co. v. Rasey, 142 N.Y.
570, 37 N.E. 632 (1894), which involved an equitable mortgage of after-acquired chattels.
See p. 582 supra. Glass v. Springfield, LI. Cemetery Soc. should not, therefore, be considered
as authority in equitable assignment cases. Nevertheless, it was followed in State Factors
Corp. v. Sales Factors Corp., 257 App. Div. 101, 12 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't 1939). In
addition to being unsound because of the reliance placed on a prior erroneous decision,
this case is questionable on the ground that there may never have been a valid equitable
assignment to the first assignee. See 25 Cornell L.Q. 283, 284 (1939).
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same fund who paid new value and who had no notice of the prior equitable
assignment.60
PRIORITY BETWEEN THE ASSIGNEE AND THE LIEN CREDITOR
The Problem
The question of the priority between the equitable assignee of a fund to
accrue in futuro, and the attaching creditor of the debtor-assignor would
seem easily answered by the rule that such creditor stands in no better posi-
tion than an assignee of the fund. 6 1 Hence, it is settled law that the creditor
will have preference when he acquires his lien before the assignment is made. 62
Under such circumstances, he is, in effect, a prior assignee. The difficulty in
the cases has occurred, however, when the lien is perfected after the assign-
ment. For purposes of determining priorities in this situation, the assignor's
trustee in bankruptcy is treated as an attaching creditor since (except in the
four months bankruptcy cases discussed below) the rights of each, in relation
to the equitable assignee, are held to be identical.
63
The Rule
The general rule is that an attaching creditor has rights in the attached
property no greater than those possessed by his debtor.6 4 In Williams v. Inger-
soll,6 5 the court of appeals utilized this principle to determine the priority of
rights between an attorney who was the assignee from his client of a portion
of the anticipated recovery in a lawsuit, and the client's judgment creditor
whose lien was perfected before any recovery was obtained. In preferring the
rights of the attorney, the court held that, "'immediately on the assignment
the equitable interest in the debt as between the parties to it immediately passed
60. "The equitable mortgage [security assignment] of choses in action or other in-
tangibles, present or future, need not be recorded and they are valid and enforceable against
creditors and against purchasers with or without notice. .. ." Stone, The "Equitable Mort-
gage" in New York, 20 Colum. L. Rev. 519, 534 (1920). The principle would be equally
applicable to an absolute assignment. See note 49 supra.
61. See Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508, 523 (1882); Muir v. Schenck, 3 Hill 228
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
62. Cobbe v. Stowe, 171 Misc. 687, 13 N.Y.S.2d 651 (County Ct. 1939); Fox v. Vim
Elec. Co., 156 Misc. 621, 281 N.Y. Supp. 459 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1935). These cases hold
that the creditor acquires his lien when be serves upon the assignor's obligor a subpoena
in supplementary proceedings.
63. In re Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1942); Sammet v. Mayer, 108 F.2d 337, 339
n.1 (2d Cir. 1939); Kniffin v. State, 283 N.Y. 317, 323, 28 N.E.2d 853, 855 (1940); cf.
Annot., 73 A.L.R. 1063 (1931). Under § 70-c of the Bankruptcy Act, "the trustee, as to
all property, whether or not coming into possession or control of the court, upon which a
creditor of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at
the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of such date with all the rights, remedies,
and powers of a creditor then holding a lien thereon by such proceeding, whether or not
such a creditor actually exists." 66 Stat. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1953).
64. McCloskey v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 285 App. Div. 148, 153, 136 N.Y.S.2d 55, 59 (1st
Dep't), aff'd mem., 308 N.Y. 998, 127 N.E.2d 847 (1955); Muir v. Schenck, 3 Hill 228, 232
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (dictum).
65. 89 N.Y. 508 (1882).
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to the assignee. And if the assignor had afterward recovered the debt, he would
be obliged to pay it over to the assignee. But an attaching creditor cannot
stand a better footing than his debtor . . . and if he attaches any property of
his debtor, it must be attached subject to all lawfully existing liens created
by his debtor. And consequently if his debtor have no equitable interest in a
chose in action, the creditor cannot acquire any by his attachment.' "66
Upon this same principle, the assignee of an expectancy in the estate of a
person still living has a claim to the assignor's interest in the estate when it
comes in esse, prior to that of the assignor's subsequently attaching creditor.
67
Similar preferences have been accorded to the assignee of future freight,6e and
of future accounts receivable,69 and of future rent.70 The assignee of moneys
to become due under a construction contract has priority not only over the
assignor's subsequently attaching creditors,71 but also over laborers and mate-
rialmen claiming under mechanics' liens, providing the assignment was made
before the notice of lien was filed.72 In order to maintain this priority over
66. Id. at 522-23 (quoting Dix v. Cobb, 4 Mass. 508, 512 (1808); accord, Schoenherr
v, Van Meter, 215 N.Y. 548, 109 N.E. 625 (1915); In re Woods' Estate, 144 N.Y.S.2d 880
(Surr. Ct. 1955); Bendix v. Dougherty, 131 N.Y.L.J., No. 84, p. 9, col. 2 (N.Y. City Ct.,
May 3, 1954); Weinberg v. Schwartz, 14 N.Y.S.2d 554 (N.Y. City Ct. 1939). Restatement,
Contracts § 172(1) (1932) states that an effective assignment prevails over a subsequent
attachment. It must be noted, however, that the New York and. the Restatement positions
as to what future rights may be effectively assigned are quite different. See note 21 supra.
The Restatement further states that, 'if an obligor garnisheed for a debt due from him to
the assignor neither knows nor has reason to know, until after judgment has been rendered
charging him, of an assignment of the debt made prior to the garnishment, he is discharged
from his duty to the assignee." Id. at § 172(2). That payment in good faith before notice
of the assignment is required in New York for discharge of the obligor (and not a judgment
merely), see Restatement, Contracts, N.Y. Annot. § 172 (2).
67. In re Barnett, 124 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1942); Stover v. Eyceshimer, 42 N.Y. 620
(1867); In re Cornell's Will, 170 Misc. 638, 12 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Surr. Ct.-1939); see Annot.,
17 AL.R. 597 (1922); 44 A.L.R. 1465 (1926).
N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 32 provides that an assignment of an expectancy in an estate
may be recorded, "and if not so recorded, it is void against any subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee of the same interest or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable con-
sideration, whose conveyance or mortgage is first duly recorded."
68. Kimball v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Natl Bank, 138 N.Y. 500, 34 N.E. 337 (1893),
cf. 4 Pomeroy, Equity § 1289 (5th ed. 1941).
69. Greey v. Dockendorff, 231 U.S. 513 (1913); In re Hawley Down-Draft Furnace Co.,
238 Fed. 122 (3d Cir. 1916) ; see Annot., 72 A.L.R. 856 (1931).
70. See Abelow, An Historical Analysis of Assignments of Rent In New York, 6 Brook-
lyn L. Rev. 25, 37-40 (1936).
71. Kniffin v. State, 283 N.Y. 317, 28 N.E.2d 853 (1940); Arrow Iron Works, Inc. v.
Greene, 260 N.Y. 330, 183 N.E. 515 (1932); Edison Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Horace E.
Frick Co., 221 N.Y. 1, 116 N.E. 369 (1917); Bates v. Salt Springs Nat'l Bank, 157 N.Y.
322, 51 N.E. 1033 (1898).
72. Stevens v. Ogden, 130 N.Y. 182, 29 N.E. 229 (1891); Wood v. Galway & Co., 186
App. Div. 134, 173 N.Y. Supp. 644 (3d Dep't 1919); Post & McCord v. City of New York,
86 Misc. 300, 148 N.Y. Supp. 568 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem., 166 App. Div. 919, 152 N.Y. Supp.
1138 (lst Dep't 1915).
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mechanics' lienors, however, the assignee must file his assignment.7a Failure
to file will not affect the assignee's priority over any other lien creditor except
mechanics' lienors 7 4
A difficult problem arises when the contractor has defaulted and his surety
has elected to complete the work. Both the surety and the contractor's
assignee will claim whatever funds still remain due to the contractor from the
owner of the improved property. In New York, the surety's claim is pre-
ferred. 76 This is so despite the fact that, "a surety must generally have paid
the debt before he can proceed to enforce a right of subrogation, and apparently
for the purpose of determining the rights to which the surety can be subrogated
his right is not regarded as accruing until the time of payment .... ,,"1 Since
the surety's right does not accrue until the time of payment, should it not be
subordinated to the prior equitable assignment? "[F]or the purpose of de-
termining the superiority of the surety's rights over those of the principle, or
creditor, and those claiming under them, a surety's equity or potential right
to subrogation, is generally regarded, either as relating back to, or having its
inception at, the time when the contract of suretyship is entered into." 77 As
a result, under the first-in-time, first-in-right rule of assignments, the surety
prevails.
All the cases discussed above have recognized the general rule that the at-
taching creditor stands in no better position than his debtor. The result has
been that the equitable assignee has, in each case where the assignment pre-
ceded the attachment, prevailed over the creditor. However, in some cases,
particularly where the court has relied upon decisions involving mortgages of
after-acquired chattels, this rule has been distorted, or rejected in whole or
in part so that the subsequently attaching creditor has been preferred to the
prior equitable assignee.
Distortion of the Rule
In Benedict v. Ratner 8 The United States Supreme Court, purporting to
apply New York law, held that an assignment of future accounts receivable,
under which the assignor was permitted to collect the proceeds and use them
as he saw fit without accountability to the assignee (though the assignee could
at his option collect the assigned accounts) was void, and hence, the assignor's
trustee in bankruptcy had prior right to the assigned accounts. The Court,
citing a number of New York cases involving the mortgage of a revolving stock
of goods, noted that, "under the law of New York a transfer of property as
security which reserves to the transferor the right to dispose of the same, or
to apply the proceeds thereof, for his own uses, is, as to creditors, fraudulent
73. See N.Y. Lien Law §§ 13, 15 (Supp. 1958).
74. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co. v. Horace E. Frick Co., 221 N.Y. 1, 116 N.E. 369
(1917); Doyle v. East New York Say. Bank, 44 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. Munic. Ct.), aff'd
per curiam, 44 N.Y.S.2d 328 (2d Dep't).
75. See 12 Fordham L. Rev. 73 (1943). For cases in other jurisdictions, see Annot., 76
A.L.R. 917 (1932); 20 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 494 (1951).
76. In re McClancy's Estate, 182 Misc. 866, 869, 45 N.Y.S.2d 917, 921 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
77. Id. at 921-22.
78. 268 U.S. 353 (1925); accord, In re M. J. Hoey & Co., 19 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1927).
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in law and. void." 79 The Court conceded that this rule had never been applied
in New York to the security assignment of accounts receivable, but nevertheless,
it held that, "whether the collateral consist of chattels or of accounts, reserva-
tion of dominion inconsistent with the effective disposition of title must render
the transaction void."8 10 This left Justice Brandeis in the dilemma of applying
the "possession" doctrine of chattel mortgages to non-possessable choses in
action. With Cardozian dexterity, he slipped between the horns simply by
changing the ratio of the revolving stock mortgage cases. He asserted that the
rule of these cases, "rests not upon seeming ownership because of possession
retained, but upon a lack of ownership because of dominion reserved."81
Of course, "seeming ownership because of possession retained" is in fact
the basis of the revolving stock mortgage cases, and "seeming ownership"
obviously has no applicability to intangible accounts receivable. Thus, Judge
Learned Hand, in In re Michigan Furniture Co. 8 2 identified the underlying
principle of the revolving stock cases as, "the doctrine of reputed ownership
• . . [which] does not in the United States include any kind of choses in
action ... ."83 Tracing the origin of the doctrine, Judge Hand found that it,
[R]ested upon the putative credit which the possessor was enabled to enjoy by the
display of the goods . . . and it is at least questionable whether, in the absence of
some specific deception, traders' debts are a source of putative credit. However that
may be, the rule based upon the possessor's power of disposal in New York arose as
an application of the doctrine of reputed ownership of a stock of goods, and should
be as much so confined as that doctrine is in its other application.8 4
Not only was Ratner contra to the New York law of assignment of accounts
receivable, but also it was contra to an entire line of New York cases which
had expressly rejected "dominion reserved" as a test of the validity of the
assignment of other forms of choses in action.8 5 As a matter of fact, no criteria
of "dominion reserved" were set forth in Ratner, thus casting further doubt
upon the decision.80
79. 268 U.S. at 360.
80. Id. at 361-62.
81. Id. at 363.
82. 249 Fed. 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
83. Id. at 979 (emphasis added); accord, Stackhouse v. Holden, 66 App. Div. 423, 73
N.Y. Supp. 203 (4th Dep't 1901).
84. 249 Fed. at 980. "The essential basis for denying full validity to mortgages of stock
in trade held for resale is to protect creditors extending credit relying upon a mortgagor's
visible possession and apparent ownership of a fluctuating stock of merchandise." Cohen &
Gerber, Mortgages of Accounts Receivable, 29 Geo. L.J. 555, 561 (1941). In the case of
accounts receivable financing, "there is simply no visible possession of anything by the
assignor upon which creditors can rely." Ibid.
85. See Niles v. Mathusa, 162 N.Y. 546, 57 N.E. 184 (1900) (assignor retained pos-
session of assigned liquor tax certificate); Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N.Y. 277, 41 NE. 572
(1895) (assignor continued in performance of construction contract after assignment of
funds to become due thereunder); Fairbanks v. Sargent, 104 N.Y. 108, 9 N.E. 870 (1870)
(assignor maintained control over a law suit after assigning part of the recovery to his
lawyer).
86. A valiant attempt to define dominion was made in 24 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 598 (1949).
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It has been suggested that in view of the intervening decision in Erie R. R.
v. Tompkins,8 7 the true New York law, as opposed to the distorted version
thereof promulgated in Ratner, may yet come to the fore.88 As a matter of fact,
Ratner may have already been overruled by Matter of Gruner.8 9
Matter of Gruner concerned the conflicting claims, first, of the assignee of
the proceeds of the sale of a stock exchange seat (the assignment having been
made, at a time when no contract to sell the seat existed, as security for a
loan), second, of the United States for income taxes of the assignor which had
accrued between the date of the assignment and the date of the sale of the seat,
and third, of New York State for income taxes for the same period.
The United States was adjudged to have a statutory priority in the fund to
the extent of its tax lien. The "secret" federal tax lien has been the subject of
several articles,90 and is not within the scope of this comment. The real ques-
tion in the case was that of priority between the assignee and New York State,
as tax lienor.
The court of appeals rejected Ratner as controlling authority:
In the instant case there was not the reservation of a dominion which permitted
the diminishing of the value of the membership in the exchange and of the seat, but,
on the contrary, an agreement 'to maintain said membership and seat free of claim of
the New York Stock Exchange or any firm to which any member of the New York
Stock Exchange belongs or to anyone else.' 91
Surrogate Foley, in the trial court, had come to the opposite conclusion,92
finding that the promise not to exercise the power to encumber implied that
such power actually did exist in the assignor. He held that it was this power
to diminish the res which the "reservation of dominion" rule of Ratner had
contemplated.
Not only did the assignor retain the power to encumber, but it appears also
that every transaction conducted by the assignor did in fact, under the rules
of the exchange, amount to a potential encumbrance on the seat.9 3 It has been
astutely suggested, therefore, that the "dominion reserved" in Gruner was at
least equal to that in Ratner and thus Ratner may no longer be the law in
New York.94
Rejection In Part
Having disposed of Ratner, the Gruner court went on to find that the as-
signee's "inchoate" lien had become "perfected" when the fund came into
existence. It became necessary then to determine when the state had estab-
87. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
88. Cohen & Gerber, supra note 84, at 562-63.
89. 295 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.2d 514 (1946).
90. Cross, Federal Tax Claims: Nature And Effect Of The Government's Weapons For
Collection, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1958); Seligson, The "Secret" Federal Tax Lien, 139
N.Y.L.J., May 15, 1958, p. 4, col. 1; May 16, 1958, p. 4, col. 1; May 19, 1958, p. 4, col. 1.
91. 295 N.Y. at 518-19, 68 N.E.2d at 519.
92. 186 Misc. 438, 54 N.Y.S.2d 330 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
93. See 32 Cornell L.Q. 402, 406 (1947).
94. Id. at 405-08.
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lished its tax lien, and the case was remitted to the surrogate's court for further
proof25
On remand, it was determined that the state had perfected its tax lien before
the fund had come in esse, and, on that ground, it had a right to the fund prior
to that of the assignee.9 6 The holding violates in part the general rule that
the attaching creditor stands in no better position than his debtor, and to this
extent the decision is unsound. In City of New York v. Clouse,9 7 on the other
hand, the city's tax lien, which had been perfected before the fund (proceeds
of a law suit) came into existence, was held to be inferior to the claim of the
prior equitable assignee. The court correctly held that the fund, as soon as it
came into existence, was impressed with the equitable interest of the assignee.
A judicial aberration, like that in Gruner, has occurred also where the
assignment is made at a time when the assignor is solvent, but the fund does
not come into existence until four months prior to the filing of a petition, by or
against the assignor, in bankruptcy. In this situation the courts have called the
assignment a voidable preference if the assignor was insolvent when the fund
accrued9
In re Modell"a offers the explanation of this doctrine. There the court re-
jected as precedent the equitable assignment cases, and relied instead upon
the mortgage on after-acquired chattels decisions. As a result, the court came
95. 296 N.Y. 668, 69 N.E.2d 822 (1946).
96. 4 Misc. 2d 471, 74 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
97. 197 Misc. 154, 95 N.Y.S.2d 26 (Sup. Ct. 1950).
98. Okin v. Isaac Goldman Co., 79 F.2d 317 (2d Cir. 1935); In re Modell, 71 F.2d 148
(2d Cir. 1934). A preference is defined by § 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act 64 Stat. 25 (1950),
11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1953): "(1) A preference is a transfer . . . of any of the property of a
debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or
suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or
against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, the effect of which
transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than
some other creditor of the same class.
"(2) For the purposes of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section, a transfer of property
other than real property shall be deemed to have been made or suffered at the time when
it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal
or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the
transferee.... [Ilf any transfer of other property [than real property] is not so perfected
against such Hens by legal or equitable proceedings prior to the filing of a petition initiating
a proceeding under this title, it shall be deemed to have been made immediately before the
filing of the petition.
"(3) ....
"(4) A lien obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings . . .is a lien arising in ordinary
course of such proceedings upon the entry or docketing of a judgment or decree, or upon
attachment, garnishment, execution, or like process .... "
A preference is voidable under § 60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, "if the creditor receiving
it or to be benefited thereby or his agent acting with reference thereto has, at the time
when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent." 52 Stat.
870 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1952).
99. 71 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1934).
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to the conclusion that, "the assignee must take possession before the rights of
the assignor's trustee in bankruptcy arise,"'100 i.e., four months before filing
of the petition. It seems sufficient answer to the case to inquire how one would
go about taking possession of a non-possessable chose in action under any
circumstances.
Only in the "four month bankruptcy cases" is the assignor's trustee in bank-
ruptcy given greater rights than the lien creditor in determining preference
over a prior equitable assignee. There is no reason for this exception to the
general rule. The assignee, as a result of an assignment before the four months
period, has at all times possessed the equitable interest in the fund, and the
trustee's rights should be subject thereto. 01
Rejection In Entirety
In City of New York v. Bedford Bar & Grill, Inc., 0 2 the primary issue was
the priority of rights between the assignee of the proceeds of a future refund
on a liquor license (the assignment having been given to secure a loan out of
which the license was procured) and the city whose tax lien had been per-
fected after the right to the refund had accrued. The majority of the court
relied upon the equitable mortage cases and found in favor of the subsequent
lienor. The minority relied upon the distinction between the equitable mort-
gage and the equitable assignment decisions and found in favor of the assignee.
The majority also pointed to a number of lower court decisions, on all fours
with the facts of Bedford Bar & Grill, in which the attaching creditor had been
preferred to the prior equitable assignee of the license refund. 0 3  It seems
enough to observe that these decisions were also founded upon the inapplicable
equitable mortgage cases.10 4
There is a pragmatic theme to the majority opinion. In citing the lower court
cases the court thought that, "especially as to such law merchant questions,
adherence to the precedents upon which businessmen and their lawyers rely
is most desirable."'0 5 Had the court rested there, the opinion might be less
vulnerable. However, it went further, speciously distinguishing the Gruner case
(which had held the rights of the assignee prior to those of the creditor, at
least where the fund accrued before the attachment), and placing reliance upon
the inapposite equitable mortgage cases.
Moreover, the court failed entirely to meet a significant argument advanced
by the assignee. In the leading equitable mortgage case of Zartman v. First
100. Id. at 149 (emphasis added).
101. See Rubin v. Whitney, 162 Misc. 821, 830-31, 295 N.Y. Supp. 255, 265 (Sup. Ct.
1937).
102. 2 N.Y.2d 429, 141 N.E.2d 575, 161 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1957).
103. Id. at 432, 141 N.E.2d at 576. Montrose Industrial Bank v. Brennan, 102 N.Y.L.J.
1865 (1939), is a lower court case which is contra to this line of decisions.
104. See, e.g., Palmer v. Tremaine, 259 App. Div. 951, 20 N.Y.S.2d 145 (3d Dep't 1940);
F. & M. Schaefer Brewing Co. v. Amsterdam Tavern Inc., 171 Misc. 352, 12 N.Y.S.2d 701
(Sup. Ct. 1939).
105. 2 N.Y.2d at 432, 141 N.E.2d at 576, 161 N.Y.S.2d at 68.
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Nat'l Bank,10 6 the court, as a make-weight in preferring the subsequent at-
taching creditor to the prior mortgagee of after-acquired chattels, had reasoned
that the chattels had been acquired either directly or indirectly from the cred-
itors themselves, and they had a right to rely upon them to satisfy the assignor's
debt. The assignee in Bedford Bar & Grill pointed out to no avail, that the
liquor license had been purchased with funds he had advanced for that very
purpose, and hence, he could claim the same equities as the creditor in Zart-
This same argnment received better attention in Greey v. Dockendorff. 08
There the United States Supreme Court preferred the rights of the prior assignee
of future accounts receivable to the claims of the assignor's trustee in bank-
ruptcy because the funds advanced by the assignee had been used to procure
the goods, the sale of which gave rise to the assigned accounts.
The Bedford Bar & Grill case violates completely the rule that the attaching
creditor stands in no better position than his debtor. Admittedly the result
reached may have been pragmatically desirable, but, "how a result is reached
concerns the rational development of law."' 0 9 The way in which the result was
reached in the Bedford Bar & Grill case contributes only anomalies to legal
development. Making a similar contribution to legal development are the wage
assignment cases. They represent an object lesson in the genesis of bad law.
It was early held in Cooper v. Douglass'" that an assignment of wages to
be earned during an unspecified future employment imparts no equitable rights
to the assignee upon accrual of the fund since it had "in fact no real or con-
templated existence at the time the contract is entered into.""' The assign-
ment merely gives rise to an "obligatory contract as between the parties, for
the breach of which the defaulting party may be liable in damages-but not
having the effect of a specific lien upon these earnings and property them-
selves." 112
The assignor in Matter of Black"13 assigned to his wife all his future
earnings from any employment he might thereafter obtain. He did in fact hand
over his wages to his wife after he had found employment. The transfers were,
however, in violation of an order in supplementary proceedings which had been
obtained by the assignor's judgment creditor after the original assignment, and
which forbade the debtor-assignor to transfer any property in which he had
an interest. Relying on some old equitable mortgage cases, the court, in this
motion by the judgment creditor to punish the assignor for contempt, ruled,
despite Cooper v. Douglass, that the original assignment had given rise to an
equitable lien in the assignor's future earnings in favor of the assignee. Never-
106. 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907).
107. Brief for Appellant, pp. 15-16.
108. 231 U. S. 513 (1913).
109. Czaplicki v. The Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 535 (1956) (concurring opinion
of Frankfurter J.) (emphasis added).
110. 44 Barb. 409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1864).
111. Id. at 417.
112. Ibid.
113. 138 App. Div. 562, 123 N.Y. Supp. 371 (2d Dep't 1910).
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theless, the opinion made no attempt to fix the rights of the parties in the fund.
It stated only that, "when the legal title to property is in a judgment debtor,
he has no right to violate a positive order of the court and turn it over in settle-
ment of an equitable claim or lien, no matter how meritorious that claim may
be, until appropriate proceedings have been taken to establish such claim."1 4
Unfortunately, the holding of Matter of Black was completely misinter-
preted in Finelblatt v. Giant Laundry, Inc.," 5 where the court formulated
the rule that the equitable right of an assignee in the assignor's future wages,
where no contract of employment existed at the time of the assignment, was
inferior to that of a subsequently attaching creditor. The original law was that
such an assignment gave rise to no equitable rights in the assignee; the evolved
law involves an erroneous rejection of the principle that the attaching creditor
stands in no better position than his debtor. It might be noted in passing that
the equitable assignee of wages to be earned under an existing contract of em-
ployment will have preference in the fund to a subsequently attaching creditor
of the assignor." 6
The equitable assignee of a fund to accrue in futuro should have a claim in
the fund in preference to the claims both of the assignor's subsequent lien
creditor, and of his trustee in bankruptcy, whether the attachment was levied
or the petition filed before or after the fund accrued, and whether the fund
accrued without or within the four months period preceding the bankruptcy
of the assignor.
CONCLUSION
No attempt has been made in this comment to adjudge the advisability of
maintaining separate theories of law for equitable assignments of future funds,
and equitable mortgages of after-acquired chattels. In these days of the free
assignability of choses in action, it may well be argued that "non-possessability
of a debt" is an anachronism, and that some protection, similar to that offered
in the equitable mortgage situation, should be afforded to the subsequent
assignee and to the subsequently attaching creditor. Certain recording statutes
already offer limited protection. Perhaps a sweeping amendment of the chattel
mortgage recording act to include mortgages of after-acquired chattels, and
assignments of choses in action, in esse and in futuro, would offer the equitable
solution. It seems apparent, in any event, that it will have to be the legislature
that accomplishes the changes. Whenever the judiciary has attempted to extend
equitable mortgage protection to equitable assignment situations, it has ended
up attempting to reconcile two completely incompatible theories of law. The
result has been an atmosphere of doubt and uncertainty.
114. 138 App. Div. at 565, 123 N.Y. Supp. at 373 (emphasis added).
115. 145 Misc. 889, 260 N.Y. Supp. 385 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1932); accord, Hirschberg
v. Chic Dress Co., 72 Misc. 339, 130 N.Y. Supp. 134 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1911).
116. National City Bank v. Bon Ray Dance Frocks Inc., 153 Misc. 549, 275 N.Y. Supp.
510 (N.Y. Munic. Ct. 1934); Penhollow v. Lawyers' Title Ins. Co., 30 Misc. 778, 63 N.Y.
Supp. 390 (Sup. Ct., App. T. 1900). Assignments of wages are now subject to considerable
statutory restriction in New York. See N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law art. 3A.
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